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ABSTRACT
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elasticity. For the five ASEAN countries studied in this paper, the relationship between private and
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which has a near zero elasticity of substitution.
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1. Introduction 
 
 An important issue in the design of fiscal policy is the substitutability between 
government and private consumption. If the private sector derives utility from 
government–provided goods and services and regards private and government 
consumption as close substitutes, an increase in government consumption will be offset 
by a corresponding decrease in private consumption, rendering the size of the fiscal 
multiplier relatively small and even potentially negative. On the other hand, if private and 
government consumption are complements, an expansionary fiscal policy will be 
relatively effective in stimulating aggregate demand as private consumption will 
reinforce the initial fiscal impulse. While it is easy to give examples of individual private 
and government goods that are substitutes or complements, it is an empirical question 
whether aggregate private and government consumption are substitutes or complements 
for a particular economy during certain period. The purpose of this paper is to empirically 
study the substitutability issue for nine East Asian countries – the four northeast countries: 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, and the five southeast ASEAN countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.       
 Traditional macroeconomic models assume that government consumption works 
through its impact on private consumption through wealth effect or interest rate effect. 
Private consumption is crowded out either because the consumers may feel poorer as a 
result of negative wealth effect or they may be induced to postpone consumption in 
response to deficit–financed government spending. Bailey (1971) and Barro (1981) first 
suggest incorporating government consumption into the representative agent decision 
problem, making the public sector part of the general equilibrium system. The idea is that 
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many government goods are to some extent substitutes for private consumption goods. 
Moreover, government purchases may also serve as useful inputs to the private 
production function so that government consumption can be productive. This is in 
contrast to the traditional models in which government consumption are regarded as 
purely wasteful or unrelated to private consumption or production. In recent theoretical 
literature, the interaction between government and private consumption has been assigned 
a central role in the study of fiscal policy, in both the neoclassical real business cycle 
fashion (e.g. Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993)) and the new Keynesian 
fashion with monopolistic competition, increasing returns, and nominal rigidities (e.g. 
Devereux et al. (1996) and Ganelli (2003)). However, depending on their assumptions 
about market structure and technology, these models can predict totally different reaction 
of private consumption in response to government spending shocks.       
 On the empirical front, a large literature has been developed to estimate the 
relationship between government and private consumption. Kormendi (1983) and 
Aschauer (1985) are representative of the earlier approach that relies on estimating a 
consumption function.  Karras (1994), Ni (1995), Evans and Karras (1996), and Fiorito 
and Kollintzas (2004) are some of the more recent contributions along this approach. Ni’s 
paper also provides a useful survey of the literature. The empirical analysis in this paper 
follows Amano and Wirjanto (1997, 1998) who make use of the cointegration approach 
of Ogaki (1992) and Ogaki and Park (1997) to estimate the preference parameter that 
governs the relationship between government and private consumption. The idea is to 
exploit the long–run restriction imposed by the intraperiod first–order condition that 
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characterizes the optimal choice of private and government consumption. Ho (2001), 
Chiu (2001), and Okubo (2003) are some recent contributions along the same line.     
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
model in detail. We provide a structural interpretation to the cointegrating regression 
model by deriving it as an equilibrium condition. Section 3 provides a brief description of 
government expenditures in East Asia. The data and empirical results are presented in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The empirical model  
 
 The empirical work in this paper centers around a cointegrating regression that 
relates the logarithm of private and government consumption ratio, /t tC G , to the 
logarithm of their relative price /g ct tP P :  
 
(1)   ln( / ) ln( / )g ct t t t tC G P P uα β= + +  
 
where ln( / )t tC G and ln( / )g ct tP P  are both difference–stationary I(1) processes, and tu  is 
a stationary I(0) process. Formal statistical evidence for the cointegration property will be 
provided below. The slope parameter β  is the elasticity of substitution between private 
and government consumption. A positive (negative) β  means that the two goods are 
substitutes (complements). One attractive feature of cointegrating regression is that the 
slope parameters can be estimated consistently without the assumption that the regressors 
 4 
are econometrically exogenous. In eq. (1), for example, β  can still be estimated 
consistently even though there may be stationary omitted variables or measurement errors.  
 So far eq. (1) is treated as a pure statistical relationship between the consumption 
ratio of private and government goods and their relative prices. It is possible to provide 
the equation a structural interpretation by deriving it as an equilibrium condition, 
following the ideas of Ogaki (1992), Ogaki and Park (1997), and Ogaki and Reinhart 
(1998). Assume that the representative consumer values two goods, private and 
government, according to an expected life–time utility function subject to stationary 
preference shocks:      
 
(2)   
0
[ ( *)]jt t j
j
U E u Cδ
∞
+
=
=   
 
where 
 
(3)   1 (1/ ) 1 (1/ ) 1/[1 (1/ )]* [ (1 ) ]t t t t tC C Gσ σ σφε φ ν− − −= + −  
 
( , )t tε ν  are random preference shocks which are assumed to be strictly stationary, have 
unit mean and finite variances. The stationarity assumption amounts to say preferences 
are stable in the long run. The period utility function is assumed to possess the usual 
properties ' 0u >  and ' 0.u < ( , )φ σ  are preference parameters which characterize the 
representative agent’s utility function: φ  is the relative weight assigned to private goods 
and σ  is the substitution parameter which measures the curvature of the indifference 
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curves. Given time–separability of the utility function, the optimal consumption bundle 
will have to satisfy the equality between marginal rate of substitution and relative price:    
 
(4)   
1/
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Taking logarithm and rearranging yields  
 
(5)  ln( / ) ln[(1 ) / ] ln( / ) ln( / )g ct t t t t tC G P Pσ φ φ σ σ ν ε= − − + −  
 
Stable preferences implies that the residual term, ln( / ),t tσ ν ε−  is stationary and hence eq. 
(5) should be a cointegrating regression, provided that log consumption ratio, ln( / ),t tC G  
and log price ratio, ln( / ),g ct tP P are both I(1) processes. In other words, the stable 
preferences assumption, together with the consumer optimality condition in eq. (4), 
imposes a cointegration restriction on the movements of the log consumption ratio and 
the log price ratio series. Eq. (5) provides a structural interpretation to eq. (1) which can 
be regarded as the reduced form equation with parameters and residuals related to their 
structural counterpart via the relationships  
 
(6)    ln[(1 ) / ], , ln( / )t t tuα σ φ φ β σ σ ν ε= − − = = −    
 
 Notice that eq. (5) is a theoretical demand equation, whereas eq. (1) is an 
empirical equation describing the equilibrium quantities and prices. Just like the classical 
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supply–and–demand simultaneous equation model, interpreting eq. (1) as the demand 
equation requires identification assumption. In general, to identify the demand equation, 
we need variability from the supply side and the demand side should be relatively stable. 
Since the supply side has to do with production which is subject to technological 
improvement, it is reasonable to expect the quantity supplied series should be highly 
persistent which can be modeled as a stochastic trend. The demand side, on the other 
hand, has to do with taste and it is reasonable to expect preference shocks are relatively 
stable in comparison with technological shocks. In the context of demand analysis, Ogaki 
(1992) has shown formally that the assumptions of stable preferences and a stochastic 
trend in the quantity supplied are sufficient to ensure identification of a cointegrating 
demand equation like eq. (1).    
 In the theoretical analyses of Bailey (1971) and Barro (1981), followed by the 
empirical work of Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Evans and Karras (1996), among 
many others, the effective consumption is specified as a weighted average of private and 
government consumption:  
 
(7)   *t t tC C Gθ= +  
 
In this setup each unit of government goods is equivalent to  units of private goods, 
irrespective of the current consumption level of the two goods. In other words, the 
indifference curves for the two goods are linear which corresponds to the extreme case of 
σ = +∞  in the CES aggregator function in eq. (3). Clearly this is an empirically 
restrictive assumption, albeit a convenient one for analytical tractability.   
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3. Government expenditures in East Asia 
 
 Table 1 reports a summary of the government expenditures by economic type (in 
percentage of GDP) for the Asian countries studied in this paper, together with the 
corresponding figures for the United States for comparison. The data source is World 
Bank (2004) which in turn is based on the primitive data in the IMF Government 
Financial Statistics Yearbook. Total government outlays comprise of government 
purchase of goods and services, wages and salaries for government employees, public 
capital investment, transfer payments, and interest payments of outstanding government 
debts. In terms of total outlays, the governments of the Asian countries are comparable in 
size to that of the United States, except for the Malaysia government which stands out as 
the outlier of the group. The pattern of government expenditures among the Asian 
countries is more heterogeneous. Japan and Korea seem to differ from the rest of the 
Asian countries and their government expenditure patterns are broadly comparable to that 
of the United States. The governments of Hong Kong and the five ASAEN countries, on 
the other hand, spend relatively more on goods and services and on government 
employee payroll. Table 1 also reveals that the Asian governments devote considerable 
amount of resources on capital investments, presumably most are on public infrastructure 
and, for the five ASEAN countries, also on national enterprises. This is in sharp contrast 
to the United States in which public investment is only 1% of GDP. Among the heavy 
public investors, the Indonesian government stands out as the largest by devoting 6.9% of 
GDP to public investment, followed by Thailand (6.5%), Singapore (5.0%), and Malaysia 
(4.8%). Another noteworthy component is transfer payments.  The transfer payments of 
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the Asian governments are all relatively low comparing with the corresponding US figure 
of 12.3%, with Japan and Korea register the highest government transfers in the 8 to 9 % 
range and Thailand reports the lowest transfers of only 1.3% of GDP. Clearly the low 
transfers in the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong reflect the relatively under–developed 
social security system and other formal welfare schemes.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
 We use annual data for 1960–2002 from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2004) whenever possible to ensure cross–country compatibility. Missing or 
erroneous entries are reconstructed from local sources. Private and government 
consumption are taken to be the relevant expenditure series from the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). The consumption ratio, / ,t tC G  is calculated from the constant 
price private and government consumption series. The two price series,  and ,g ct tP P are 
simply the respective implicit price deflators constructed by dividing the nominal series 
by the constant price counterpart.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
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 We begin by examining the time series properties of the log consumption ratio 
series, ln( / ),t tC G and the log price ratio series, ln( / ).g ct tP P  Figure 1 depicts the two 
series for all nine Asian countries. The strong persistency and co-movements of the two 
series are clearly discernable from the plots, giving an initial impression that they are 
likely to be I(1) and cointegrated. Table 2 reports formal panel unit root test results. It is 
well known that unit root tests have low power and the problem may be even worse for 
our application as we have short time series. To better utilize sample information, we 
pool the nine countries’ data to perform panel unit root tests, which have been shown to 
be more powerful than the individual time series version. All three panel unit root tests 
draw the same conclusion: the unit root null hypothesis is not rejected for the level series 
but is strongly rejected for the first–differenced series. This shows that the log 
consumption ratio and the log price ratio series are indeed I(1). Moreover, the asymmetry 
of the p–values for the level series in the IPS test and the ADF-Fisher chi-square test 
suggest that log consumption ratio is the less integrated series – in the sense that it has a 
weaker random walk component – than the log price ratio. This has important 
implications to the specification of the cointegrating regression. It is well known that 
cointegrating regression is not invariant to normalization choice –– deciding which 
variable to put on the left hand side as the regressand – and different choices may imply 
different estimates for the same parameter. For example, instead of running regression eq. 
(1), we could have run the reverse regression with the log price ratio normalized as the 
regressand to obtain an estimate of (1/ ).β  In finite sample the estimates from the direct 
and reverse regressions may be far from being reciprocal to each other and they can also 
have drastically different statistical properties. According to Ng and Perron (1997), in the 
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context of cointegrating regression, it is preferable to put the less integrated series as the 
regressand and the more integrated series as the regressor. Applying the Ng–Perron rule, 
this means that designating the log consumption ratio series as the regressand as in eq. (1) 
is indeed the right choice.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 Table 3 reports panel estimation results for eq. (1) with country specific fixed 
effects. The cointegration property of eq. (1) is confirmed by the two panel cointegration 
tests: the null hypothesis of no cointegration is decisively rejected by Kao’s (1999) ADF 
test but the null of cointegration cannot be rejected according to the McCoskey and Kao 
(1998) LM test. Turning to the elasticity of substitution between private and government 
consumption –– the coefficient of ln( / )g ct tP P  –– it can be seen that the estimates are all 
significantly positive, ranging between 0.57 and 1.05 with small standard errors, and 
varying across different estimation methods and sample periods. The empirical results 
suggest that on average private and government consumption in East Asia are substitutes 
with an elasticity of substitution midway between 0.5 and 1.  
  We also estimate an unrestricted version of eq. (1) as a simple specification check:  
 
(8)   1 2ln( / ) ln( ) ln( )g ct t t t tC G P P uα β β= + + +  
 
Eq. (1) is a restricted version of eq. (8) with 1 2 0.β β+ =  Estimates of 1 2 and β β  that are 
similar in magnitude but opposite in sign provide evidence in favor of the restriction and 
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hence eq. (1). As can be seen from Table 3, the pattern of the parameter estimates is in 
general supportive of eq. (1); and the evidence is especially strong when all nine Asian 
countries are included in the sample for the period 1978–2002 (Panel B). According to 
the fully efficient DOLS estimates, government and private consumption in East Asia 
during 1978-2002 have a substantial degree of substitutability with an elasticity of 
substitution around 1, implying a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function for eq. (3).       
From a policy perspective, the panel estimate may not be of much practical 
relevance, as it tells us little about any individual country. Table 4 therefore reports 
cointegrating regression results for the nine Asian countries individually. We also report 
the corresponding results for the United States for comparison. To check robustness, we 
try three different estimation methods which are all asymptotically efficient procedures 
for estimating cointegration regressions. The three methods are Phillips and Hansen 
(1990) fully modified ordinary least square (FM-OLS), Park (1992) canonical 
cointegrating regression (CCR), and Stock and Watson (1993) dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS). In general the parameter estimates are stable across the three estimation 
methods. Comparing the DOLS estimates of the elasticity of substitution across countries, 
Malaysia and Thailand come up with the highest values of 1.66 and 1.51, respectively, 
which are comparable to the value of 1.5 of the United States. On the other extreme are 
Indonesia and Singapore for which the negative elasticities of substitution of –0.92 and  
–1.76, respectively, imply that private and government consumption are strong 
complements. The four North East Asian countries, China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, 
share a moderate elasticity of substitution ranging from 0.41 in Hong Kong to 0.65 in 
China. The Philippines, on the other hand, has a numerically small and statistically 
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insignificant elasticity of substitution of 0.07, indicating little substitution in private and 
government consumption. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Indonesia and Thailand provide an interesting case of contrast. The estimated 
elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption is –0.92 for 
Indonesia and 1.51 for Thailand. Government consumption is a strong substitute to 
private consumption in Thailand, implying that a fiscal contraction that makes 
government goods relatively more expensive will induce substantial expansion in private 
consumption, thereby offsetting or even outweighing the negative impact of the fiscal 
contraction on aggregate demand. The Indonesian government consumption, in contrast, 
is a strong complement to private consumption, implying that a fiscal contraction that 
makes government goods relatively more expensive will generate a large negative income 
effect that outweighs the substitution effect, leading to a concomitant contraction in 
private consumption expenditure that further depresses aggregate demand. These 
predictions about the two economies’ reaction to fiscal austerity seem to be consistent 
with what have been observed during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.   
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
What explains the cross-country diversity in the substitution between private and 
government consumption? In their international study, Evans and Karras (1996) find a 
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statistically significant negative relationship between the share of government 
expenditure that goes to national defense and the degree of substitutability between 
private and government consumption. The idea is that the higher is the defense share, the 
higher is the public goods component in government consumption which reduces its 
ability to substitute for private consumption. In Table 5 we collect together for the nine 
East Asia countries their national defense expenditure shares, education expenditure 
shares, and estimated elasticities of substitution between private and government 
consumption. The entries are sorted by the substitution elasticities for ease of comparison. 
Apparently neither the education share nor the defense share can explain the empirical 
pattern of the substitution elasticities for all nine countries. However, the correlation 
between the defense shares and substitution elasticities is –0.24, confirming the empirical 
findings of Evans and Karras (1996). The strong complementarity between private and 
government consumption in Singapore seems to be testimonial to the Evans–Karras story, 
in view of the favorable international ratings of the Singaporean education system and 
other infrastructure, and the government’s well documented role in the country’s 
economic success (e.g. Low (1998) and Krause et al. (1987)). The case of Indonesia may 
appear to be defiant of the Evans–Karras explanation: the expenditures on education and 
defense are only moderate and yet private and government consumption appear to be 
complements, according to the negative sign of the substitution elasticity. One potential 
explanation is the well known fact that the Indonesian government heavily subsidies the 
private sector including fuel, electricity, fertilizer and other basic goods, and these 
subsidies are complementary to other goods in the private consumption bundle; see for 
example Hill (1996, 1999) and World Bank (2006). When the Indonesian government 
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adjusts these subsidies in tandem with the overall government spending, this will generate 
the observed co–movements of private and government consumption that gives rise to the 
estimated negative elasticity of substitution.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have estimated the degree of substitution between private and 
government consumption in nine East Asia countries. On average there is substantial 
substitutability between private and government consumption, implying there will be 
direct crowding out of private consumption by government consumption. Such direct 
crowding out effect will reinforce the conventional interest rate and wealth effect 
crowding out channels to make fiscal policy relatively ineffective in East Asia. We also 
find that the substitutability between private and government consumption varies among 
the Asian countries. Government and private consumption turn out to be complements in 
Indonesia and Singapore, but they are substitutes in other Asian countries with different 
degrees of substitutability. There is no obvious quantitative variable that can explain each 
country’s empirical estimates, although the share of government expenditure that goes to 
education and national defense seems to be negatively correlated with substitutability. 
Future study on this issue will need a more careful examination of each country’s 
institutional details – one will have to understand what sort of government services those 
public consumption figures represent – before further conclusion can be drawn.  
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Table 1: Government expenditure by economic type 1991–2000 (% of GDP) 
 Goods 
and 
services  
Wages and 
salaries  
Interest 
payments 
Subsidies 
and other 
current 
transfers 
Capital 
expenditure 
Total 
NE Asia       
  Hong Kong 
 
7.2 4.4 0.0 4.7 4.2 20.5 
   Japan 
 
–  2.3  – 
      
3.1 9.0 2.5 16.9 
   Korea 
 
5.1 2.2 0.5 8.2 2.9 18.9 
SE Asia       
   Indonesia 
 
4.1 2.3 2.1 3.9 6.9 19.3 
   Malaysia 
 
10.6 6.5 3.7 5.0 4.8 30.6 
   Philippines 
 
9.2 5.6 4.4 2.8 2.5 24.5 
   Singapore 
 
9.8 5.0 1.3 2.4 5.0 23.4 
   Thailand 
 
9.4 5.4 0.7 1.3 6.5 23.4 
       
USA 5.0 1.9 3.1 12.3 1.0 23.3 
 
Notes:  
a
  Figures are annual average of 1991– 2000, except for Japan (1981–90), Korea (1991–97) and 
Malaysia (1991–97).  
b
  Data source: World Bank (2004) for countries other than Hong Kong. Hong Kong figures are 
compiled from the Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, various years.   
c
  For Japan, the figure for goods–and–services and wages–and–salaries is the sum of the two 
components.    
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Table 2: Panel unit root tests 
 ln( / )C G  ln( / )C G∆  ln( / )g cP P  ln( / )g cP P∆  
IPS W–statistic 0.6551 
[0.2562] 
 
15.2985 
[0.0000] 
0.6002 
[0.7258] 
14.0852 
[0.0000] 
ADF – Fisher 
Chi–square 
20.3887 
[0.3114] 
 
196.183 
[0.0000] 
15.7766 
[0.6081] 
178.734 
[0.0000] 
PP – Fisher  
Chi–square 
 
18.0178 
[0.4545] 
262.871 
[0.0000] 
18.6922 
[0.4110] 
270.737 
[0.0000] 
Notes:  
a
   P–values in parentheses 
b
  H0: Each country follows an Individual unit root process.  
   H1: At least one country’s process is trend stationary    
c
  Exogenous variables: individual effects, individual linear trends    
d
  Cross–sectional units: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore,   Thailand 
e
  Time period: China 1978–2002; other countries 1960–2002. 
f
  IPS = Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). ADF-Fisher and PP–Fisher are Maddala and Wu (1999) 
Fisher–type tests constructed by combining the p–values from individual augmented Dickey–
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Perron (PP) unit–root tests.   
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Table 3: Panel cointegrating regressions 
 
Regressand: ln( / )t tC G  
 
Panel A: 8 Asian countries (exclude China) 1960–2002 
 Regressors Cointegration Test 
 ln( / )g ct tP P  ln( )gtP  ln( )ctP  ADF LM 
OLS 
 
0.5722 
(0.0614) 
 
  –5.5516 
[0.0000] 
0.6516 
[0.2573] 
OLS  0.7975 
(0.0639) 
 
–0.8847 
(0.0698) 
–4.3753 
[0.0000] 
2.4090 
[0.0080] 
DOLS 0.7555 
(0.0651) 
 
    
DOLS  1.0132 
(0.0607) 
–1.1132 
(0.0646) 
  
 
 
Panel B: 9 Asian countries (include China) 1978–2002 
 Regressors Cointegration Test 
 ln( / )g ct tP P  ln( )gtP  ln( )ctP  ADF LM 
OLS 
 
0.6373 
(0.1064) 
 
  –6.8337 
[0.0000] 
0.5369 
[0.2957] 
OLS  0.5958 
(0.1361) 
 
–0.5718 
(0.1709) 
–6.7290 
[0.0000] 
0.4498 
[0.3264] 
DOLS 1.0589 
(0.0999) 
 
    
DOLS  0.9740 
(0.1250) 
–0.9073 
(0.1591) 
 
  
Notes:  
a
  Standard errors in parentheses  
b
  P–values in square brackets   
c
  All regressions include country–specific fixed effect (unreported)   
d
  DOLS = Kao and Chiang (2000) panel dynamic OLS. The regression is augmented with one 
lead and one lag of the first difference of the regressors (unreported).   
e
  ADF = Kao (1999) panel ADF test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  The lag length 
in the test regression is chosen by the Schwarz criterion.   
f
  LM = McCoskey and Kao (1998) panel LM test for the null hypothesis of cointegration  
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Table 4: Individual cointegrating regressions 
 FM–OLS CCR DOLS 
NE Asia intercept ln( / )g ct tP P  intercept ln( / )g ct tP P  intercept ln( / )g ct tP P  
   China 1.3334 
(0.0161) 
 
0.6699 
(0.1452) 
1.3335 
(0.0161) 
0.6691 
(0.1513) 
1.3526 
(0.0216) 
0.6524 
(0.2136) 
   Hong Kong 1.8645 
(0.0245) 
 
0.3242 
(0.0556) 
1.8656 
(0.0259) 
0.3269 
(0.0575) 
1.8772 
(0.0260) 
0.3424 
(0.0468) 
   Japan 1.3063 
(0.0204) 
0.2962 
(0.1026) 
 
1.3064 
(0.0192) 
0.2986 
(0.0758) 
1.3329 
(0.0119) 
0.4149 
(0.0780) 
   Korea 
 
1.6748 
(0.0297) 
0.5770 
(0.0594) 
1.6755 
(0.0300) 
0.5778 
(0.0591) 
1.6468 
(0.0177) 
0.5233 
(0.0331) 
 
SE Asia       
   Indonesia 1.8534 
(0.1038) 
 
–0.9809 
(0.5449) 
1.8574 
(0.1030) 
–0.9273 
(0.5090) 
1.8613 
(0.0449) 
–0.9243 
(0.2614) 
 
   Malaysia 1.3427 
(0.0255) 
1.6028 
(0.3979) 
1.3421 
(0.0257) 
1.6218 
(0.4106) 
1.3420 
(0.0193) 
1.6601 
(0.3488) 
 
   Philippines 2.2307 
(0.0423) 
0.0458 
(0.1288) 
2.2334 
(0.0421) 
0.0328 
(0.1333) 
2.2179 
(0.0361) 
0.0707 
(0.1207) 
 
   Singapore 1.4852 
(0.0556) 
–1.9452 
(0.4855) 
1.4836 
(0.0563) 
 
–1.9716 
(0.5069) 
1.4933 
(0.0371) 
–1.7679 
(0.3586) 
   Thailand 1.7239 
(0.0684) 
 
1.3858 
(0.5139) 
1.7241 
(0.0646) 
1.3841 
(0.4778) 
1.7057 
(0.0440) 
1.5149 
(0.3447) 
USA 1.4284 
(0.0291) 
1.5373 
(0.2304) 
1.4298 
(0.0292) 
1.5155 
(0.1677) 
1.3818 
(0.0184) 
1.5078 
(0.1642) 
 
Notes:  
a
  Standard errors in parentheses  
b
  Time period: China 1978–2002; other countries 1960–2002. 
c
  FM–OLS = Fully modified OLS; CCR = Canonical cointegrating regression; DOLS = Dynamic 
OLS.  FM–OLS and CCR use Andrews’ automatic bandwidth selection method in computing 
the long run variance matrix. DOLS includes one lead and one lag of the first difference of the 
regressors in the augmented regression.   
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 Table 5: Government expenditures and substitutability  
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Defense 
(1)+(2) 
  
(4) 
Elasticity of Substitution  
        (% of expenditure) (DOLS estimate) 
Singapore 21.0 26.5 47.5 –1.76 
Indonesia   9.8   6.6 16.4 –0.92 
Philippines 15.7 10.5 26.2   0.07 
Hong Kong 14.5  0.0 14.5   0.34 
Japan   6.2  4.4 10.6   0.41 
Korea 18.8 20.0 38.8   0.52 
China  2.4 16.3 18.7   0.65 
Thailand 21.3 15.6 36.9   1.51 
Malaysia 20.4 11.7 32.1   1.66 
Correlation 
with (4) 
 
0.07 –0.24 –0.12  
Notes:  
a
  The reported expenditure figures are annual average of 1991– 95.  
b
  Data source: World Bank (2004) for countries other than Hong Kong. Hong Kong 
figures are compiled from the Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, various years.   
 
 
 24 
    Figure 1 
 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
China
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Hong Kong, China
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Indonesia
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Japan
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Korea, Rep.
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Malaysia
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Philippines
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Singapore
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Thailand
 
 
Solid = log consumption ratio ln( / )t tC G  
Dashed = log price ratio ln( / )g ct tP P  
 
 
 
 
